This article addresses whether the DNA Act (which requires DNA samples from arrestees) passes constitutional muster. I argue that the act is constitutional and that if society believes the collection of DNA from arrestees violates an individual's privacy, it should seek legislative resolution and not seek the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. Throughout my analysis, I demonstrate why DNA collection is constitutional and how it is necessary. Part I of this article examines the history of DNA sampling, case law establishing an arrestee's expectation of privacy, and the applicable Fourth Amendment tests. Part II examines the arguments for and against DNA sampling by considering case law at the state and federal level, and explores the significance of junk DNA and the treatment of abandoned DNA. Part III is the personal analysis section, which argues that the totality of circumstances test is the proper test. I apply the test to determine that there is minimal intrusion of an arrestee's expectation of privacy through DNA sampling, a legitimate governmental interest, and that warrants are unnecessary. Further, the section demonstrates why DNA sampling is a natural progression from fingerprint collection, and the section analyzes abandoned DNA and DNA sampling.
INTRODUCTION
Technological developments have changed the methods used by both criminals and law enforcement. As technology has improved, criminals have found new ways to carry out unlawful activity. In response, law enforcement has adopted modern technology to enhance its ability to combat crime. However, the use of improved methods to catch criminals to counterbalance the improved methods of committing crimes has raised constitutional concerns.
For example, current legislation allows law enforcement to require any individual arrested of a crime-regardless of innocence or guilt-to provide a DNA sample, along with the usual fingerprint collection and mug shot.
1 It has been questioned whether forcing an individual to provide a DNA sample is contrary to any constitutional limitations however, a recent Third Circuit decision has concluded that the legislation passes constitutional muster.
2
With the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 3 ("DNA Act"), Congress expanded the power of law enforcement by authorizing the collection of DNA samples from arrestees. 4 To obtain a DNA sample from an individual, law enforcement essentially only needs to arrest that person. 4 Id. 5 Id.
In United States v. Mitchell, 13 the Third Circuit addressed the reasonableness of DNA sampling of arrestees. The court held that DNA fingerprinting is akin to fingerprint collection in that the arrestees and the pretrial detainees have a diminished expectation of privacy in their identities; therefore, the collection of a DNA sample is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 14 The court applied the "totality of circumstances" test and based its reasoning on case-law that dealt with the collection of DNA samples from convicted felons.
15
The DNA Act presents an intriguing challenge for courts by introducing the question of whether the Fourth Amendment provides an arrested individual with a high enough expectation of privacy that would prevent law enforcement from obtaining a DNA sample without the intervention of a judicial magistrate. 16 Courts have treated DNA fingerprinting as a natural technological progression from simple fingerprint analysis. 17 However, courts should engage in a careful analysis before deciding that a technological progression of an already established procedure passes constitutional muster. They should consider all the safeguards and necessary precautions before finding that progression to be constitutional. established constitutional procedure. 19 The distinguishing fact from Kyllo was that the thermal imaging observed an activity that was occurring inside a home, which is private. 20 DNA sampling could be a greater intrusion into a citizen's privacy than fingerprint collection because it has the capability of revealing far more information than fingerprints. 21 
I. BACKGROUND
Consistent with the advances in technology, law enforcement has been implementing increasingly sophisticated equipment to catch criminals. 27 Although these methods have significantly aided law enforcement officials in apprehending offenders, the constitutionality of such methods has been a cause of concern. DNA fingerprinting is one such procedure where courts have struggled to determine its constitutionality. 28 The history of DNA sampling demonstrates the law's formulation and its expansion into the collection of samples from arrestees.
A. Examination of the DNA Extraction Statutes
In Although the Court stressed the importance and necessity of a search warrant, it concluded that the circumstances did not require the officer to obtain a warrant in this case because the individual's blood alcohol level was diminishing and there was an increased 54 Id. at 769-70 ("The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained."). 55 Id. at 770 (the Court considered "whether the arresting officer was permitted to draw [. . .] inferences himself, or was required instead to procure a warrant before proceeding with the test."). 56 Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 770 (1966). 57 Id. ("Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned."). 58 Id. individual's expectation of privacy, and consequently, such a search was held to be unreasonable regardless of the potential to produce evidence.
72
To arrive at this conclusion, the Court examined a number of factors used by the Schmerber Court to determine reasonableness. The effect of the intrusion on the individual's health probably became the most crucial factor for the Court. 73 
II. DISCUSSION

A. United States v. Mitchell
The revolutionary Third Circuit case of Mitchell dealt with whether, after the indictment, arrest, and detention, it is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment for the government to collect a DNA sample pursuant to the DNA Analysis Act. 92 In Mitchell, the defendant was indicted on one count of attempted possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. 93 The District Court's analysis, as well as the majority and the dissenting opinions from the Third Circuit, are relevant in understanding the arguments presented for and against DNA Sampling.
The District Court's Reasoning
The District Court applied the totality of the circumstances test and held that "'Mitchell 
The Third Circuit's Analysis
Contrary to the district court's decision, the Third Circuit applied the totality of the circumstances test and held that the collection of a DNA sample constituted a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 99 In balancing the interests of the government and the defendant, the Third Circuit stated that identifying arrestees was the most compelling interest for the government. 100 The Third Circuit found that DNA sampling and matching worked to a greater precision than fingerprinting, and therefore, DNA profiles were better for identifying individuals than fingerprints. 101 The Third Circuit acknowledged that possible misuses of DNA samples is a serious concern but ruled that the "hypothetical possibilities are unsupported by the record before 95 Id. at 412 (internal citations omitted). 96 Id. at 412 (internal citations omitted Conversely, the dissent in Mitchell held that requiring all arrestees to be swabbed violated the principles of the Fourth Amendment. 105 The dissent did not find that the government's intent to use an arrestee's DNA for the purposes of solving other crimes was a compelling interest. 106 The dissent disagreed with the majority's holding because it essentially held that if an individual was wrongfully arrested, the government would still have the right to collect a DNA sample, create a DNA profile, and upload that profile onto CODIS. 107 The dissent was uncomfortable with the idea that an arrestee could not protest or prevent the taking of his DNA, and would have to obtain a certified final court order that acquitted the arrestee, and then supply it to the government. 108 Ultimately, the dissent explained that "although his DNA profile will be expunged from CODIS, the Government will retain his DNA sample indefinitely." The dissent also determined that there was a difference between being an arrestee and a pretrial detainee (like Mitchell), and a convict, and therefore, the factors considered under the totality of the circumstances test would also be different. 110 The dissent considered the arrestees' expectation of privacy and the pretrial detainees' expectation of privacy to be much greater than that of a convict, thereby reducing the government's interest in collecting and analyzing DNA samples. 111 In terms of expectation of privacy, the dissent distinguished convicts from arrestees/pretrial detainees:
Convicts . . . have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not just accused of a crime. The conviction carries with it a permanent change in the person's status from ordinary citizen to "lawfully adjudicated criminal [ ] . . . whose proven conduct substantially heightens the government's interest in monitoring" him and "quite properly carries lasting consequences." . . . Because they have not been adjudged guilty of any crime or suffered any corresponding permanent change in their status, arrestees and pretrial detainees necessarily retain a greater expectation of privacy than convicts do.
112
With regard to the compelling governmental interest in analyzing the DNA, the dissent stated that unlike in the matter of convicted individuals, the government could not justify the collection and analysis of DNA by assuming that all individuals whose DNA was collected would be more likely than others to commit crimes in the future.
113
The dissent did not find persuasive the idea that DNA profiling is the same as fingerprinting. Unlike DNA, the science behind fingerprints and mug shots has not evolved to the point where each could be used for purposes other than identification. 114 The dissent pointed out that the collection of DNA required obtaining evidence that is found below the body's identity verification with criminal investigation. 128 The analogy between fingerprinting and DNA testing failed to consider that a DNA sample would contain the entire human genome (unlike a DNA profile), and that courts that have upheld DNA testing statutes dismissed the concern about the extent of personal information that would be available through DNA samples by mistakenly believing it to be equivalent to the information available through the DNA profile. 129 The court was cautious about the DNA profile because the presence of genetic material in "junk DNA" has been questioned.
130
The court found the analogy between fingerprinting and DNA sampling to be problematic because fingerprinting was considered routine when the courts began applying the totality of the circumstances test to such situations. 131 Since law enforcement began implementing fingerprinting as a routine booking procedure, it was not subject to the Fourth Amendment analysis and thus, it should not be the basis for concluding that DNA sampling is analogous to fingerprinting and therefore survives a Fourth Amendment analysis.
132
Additionally, the court found that DNA statutes conflated identification and investigation but in reality, courts have distinguished between identification fingerprints and investigation 128 Id. fingerprints. 133 Ultimately, the court held that DNA sampling is being used for criminal investigation and not for identification.
134
C. The Significance of Junk DNA and the Effects of Storage
The significance of "junk DNA" that is used in DNA profiles is debatable. Essentially, "junk DNA" are " [t] hirteen loci (locations on the human genome) known as single tandem repeats, or 'STRs,' and are examined to produce the DNA profiles that are standard for databases in the United States." 135 The discrepancy lies in whether "junk DNA" truly is junk or is more valuable than previously thought. merging theories do not imply that STRs 'contain predictive medical information.'"). Id. at 64 ("There are various types of non-proteincoding DNA, including pseudogenes (relics of once-functioning genes), viral DNA inserted by retrotransposons, and short tandem repeats (STRs, the type of markers used in forensic identification). Recent discoveries establish that some intergenic DNA (not "markers") is biologically significant, but no forensic STR locus has been found to be predictive."). In Williamson v. Maryland, the court held that the DNA that was obtained from abandoned property should be construed with the reasoning proposed by the DNA proponents.
151
In terms of uploading the abandoned DNA into a database, the Williamson court 152 stated that the government had a legitimate interest in identifying a person involved in a crime and had a legitimate interest in vindicating those who are falsely convicted. 153 The court questioned the possibility of achieving such results if it is deemed unlawful to upload an individual's DNA sample to discover the identity of that individual.
154
Similarly, in State v. Athan, 155 the court held that there were no recognized privacy interests for abandoned DNA, and that the government had a legitimate purpose to collect abandoned DNA for identification purposes. 156 Additionally, in Piro v. State, 157 the court acknowledged the power of DNA evidence and the amount of personal information it may reveal; but, the court rejected the DNA suppression motion because the court was persuaded that that although some appellate decisions (dealing with the collection of DNA from blood samples and cheek swabs from offenders) suggested that a privacy interest existed in the information that is included in a DNA databank, there were no appellate decisions that found warrantless DNA testing to be unconstitutional. 
III. PERSONAL ANALYSIS
Using the Fourth Amendment as a blanket that protects against every aspect of a controversial technological advancement is an unacceptable and dangerous extension of its scope. 159 The Constitution cannot and will not provide a shield against every controversial technological advancement if it is reasonable; thus, if society is against a particular procedure, it is for the legislature (as a representative of society) to determine what should be allowed and the limits (if any) that should exist. 160 Such is the case with DNA sampling because a blanket protection would exceed the scope of protection established by the Fourth Amendment.
161
Instead, there should be restrictions on the type of information that can be obtained as opposed to restricting collection of any and all information from a DNA sample; otherwise, many similar technological advances that serve legitimate governmental interests will become unavailable due to an overbroad interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
162
A. Which Test is Applicable?
The correct test for determining the constitutionality of DNA sampling is the totality of the circumstances test. The special needs test should be reserved for "those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." 163 The acquisition of a DNA sample is not as severe an intrusion into privacy as the dissent argued in Mitchell. Forced DNA extraction should be subject to a less rigorous Fourth Amendment analysis in order to better protect the Fourth Amendment's integrity when utilizing the special needs exception. 164 The special needs test is reserved for non-law enforcement purposes, which is irrelevant to DNA sampling being used for law-enforcement purposes. 165 Ultimately, if the courts were to implement the special needs test for DNA sampling, then every instance of sampling would need to be examined on a case-by-case basis, as the circumstances are important in determining whether the special needs exception was appropriately applied.
166
B. DNA Sampling and the Totality of the Circumstances Test
Under the totality of the circumstances test, the courts will determine whether the taking of the DNA served a greater governmental interest than the injury resulting from the corresponding intrusion into the individual's privacy. 167 As stated earlier, courts have considered the following factors when balancing the interests of the government and those of the individual:
the extent of the intrusion, the expectation of privacy of the individual, the need of DNA collection as a legitimate governmental interest, the safeguards implemented, and expungement possibilities.
The Extent of the Intrusion and the Arrestee's Expectation of Privacy
Counterarguments to the governmental interest focus on the theory that arrestees possess a greater expectation of privacy than convicted felons or probationers. 168 However, as mentioned earlier, courts have held that an arrestee's expectation of privacy is not free from intrusion. 169 The intrusion from a DNA sample can range from a buccal swab to a blood closer to the former. The arrestee is not under any anesthesia, and he does not endure any surgical intrusion; any intrusion that occurs would not be intended to obtain a piece of evidence. 175 For these reasons, the procedure of taking a DNA sample does not severely intrude on an arrestee's expectation of privacy. Thus, the focus of the intrusion into privacy should be on what is taken: "junk DNA."
Presently, the "junk DNA" separated from the DNA sample serves no known purpose (other than identification). 176 The possibility that "junk DNA" (more specifically the "junk DNA" taken by the FBI) 177 may reveal information in the future should not serve as a bar to the entire process. If such were the case, then fingerprints should be subject to this analysis as there is a possibility that fingerprints may reveal more than is currently known. 178 However, since fingerprint technology is used for identification purposes, there are no substantial concerns about the information that may be revealed through fingerprints. 179 The same can be said for DNA sampling. As long as the information from a DNA sample is restricted to the" junk DNA," and is used solely for identification, there are no reasonable concerns for intrusions into privacy.
Is There a Legitimate Governmental Interest?
Another factor to be considered when balancing both parties' interests is the governmental interest in DNA sampling. 180 The most compelling governmental interest that is satisfied through the collection of DNA sampling is identification. 181 DNA provides the government with the ability to identify a suspect in a crime and prevents misidentification (i.e., wrongly convicting an individual). Fingerprinting is not always a reliable method to identify the proper suspects of a crime. 182 Furthermore, fingerprints can be avoided by wearing gloves, which means that it is more likely that fingerprints will not always be left at the scene of the crime, making it difficult to identify suspects. 183 On the other hand, it is more difficult to avoid leaving DNA because DNA can be disposed of through skin cells, saliva, or hair. 184 Resultantly, DNA is helpful in identifying a suspect in a greater number of situations and to a greater accuracy. 185 The government has a legitimate interest in identifying a suspect and in preventing the wrongful accusation of an individual.
With Sufficient Safeguards, are Warrants Even Necessary?
The We accept this proposition because the identification of suspects is relevant not only to solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future crimes."). 189 Kaye, supra note 142, at 66.
Congress can limit the crimes for which, DNA may be collected from arrestees. 190 The Fourth Amendment cannot serve as a blanket protection for controversial issues that may arise. Safeguards exist to protect areas that are outside the reach of the Fourth Amendment.
If these safeguards are insufficient, then it is up to the citizenry to convince the legislature to either request new safeguards or eradicate the act altogether.
C. Why DNA is a Natural Progression from Fingerprints
The argument that DNA sampling is not a natural technological progression from fingerprints does not take into account the significant advances in fingerprint technology. With more research devoted to fingerprinting technology, the quantity and type of information that may be revealed via fingerprints could be significant. For instance, latent fingerprints may be able to reveal drug abuse. 204 The sweat that excretes from the skin's pores can be transferred, leaving unique impressions. 205 Furthermore, if more finances were devoted to fingerprints, drugs would not be the only aspect detectable from fingerprints. 206 "Cancer, diabetes, heart disease and other medical conditions produce specific chemicals also secreted in sweat and oil. By tweaking the antibodies on the particles, forensic scientists could test for a variety of medical conditions." 207 Granted, these fingerprints are not exactly the same as those taken during a booking procedure after an arrest. However, as technology advances, so do the methods of obtaining fingerprints, which could make fingerprints more reliable and in essence begin to reveal more information. 208 Additionally, genetic exceptionalists argue that DNA is too unique to be analogous to fingerprints and therefore, it warrants its own analysis. 209 However, genetic exceptionalism fails to consider the ability of fingerprints to contain hereditary information. 210 As stated, courts should focus not on the procedure or process of taking DNA, but rather on what is taken. Therefore, it makes sense to relate DNA sampling to abandoned DNA because in both instances, DNA is taken. The main difference between abandoned DNA and DNA obtained after arrest is that with abandoned DNA, the individual is unaware about his DNA being collected and law enforcement could indefinitely keep his DNA in the records without that individual's knowledge, while with the DNA obtained after arrest, the individual is aware that law enforcement took his DNA and he can expunge the DNA records pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A) (if there was no conviction). 218 If there are no privacy concerns that arise from abandoned DNA and no restrictions on abandoned DNA, then DNA sampling of arrestees should be considered less of a concern. 219 Theoretically, if DNA sampling of arrestees is not allowed, police could follow an individual around, wait for that individual to dispose of a DNA sample and then collect it before the arrest. 220 With the current DNA statute, there are specific protections that are not afforded with abandoned DNA collection.
221
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the totality of the circumstances test, the governmental interest is balanced against the individual's interest in privacy. The government has a legitimate interest in collecting DNA samples from arrestees as it is necessary for identification. There is no question as to whether DNA sampling constitutes a search, but the procedure of collecting DNA is not intrusive or unconstitutional; rather the constitutionality of DNA sampling rests on the material seized. The fact that the material seized is "junk DNA"-combined with the safeguards implemented in the DNA Act, the governmental interest and the diminished expectation of privacy of arresteeseliminates the necessity of a warrant to obtain a DNA sample and removes any Fourth Communications between participating federal, state, and local laboratories occur over a wide area network accessible to only criminal justice agencies approved by the FBI. Pursuant to federal law . . . DNA data is confidential. Access is restricted to criminal justice agencies for law enforcement identification purposes.").
